Post-Grenfell Report: every high-rise residential building should have a bespoke fire evacuation plan, developed in full consideration of the building design, the composition of occupants and crucially, the presence, or indeed absence, of effective compartmentation

 The National Centre for Social Research (NatCen) was commissioned to carry out a ‘rapid evidence review’ on the topic of evacuating high-rise buildings in March 2020. It’s report was published last week. The lack of clear evidence on fire evacuation in tall buildings limits the usefulness of the report.  These are its conclusions, I have highlighted those I think most relevant to Brent. The recommendation that each individual high-rise building should have a bespoke fire evacuation plan is crucial:

 

Overall, the findings of this review show that despite there being a high-volume of research focused on fire evacuation generally, the availability of evidence focused specifically on fire evacuation in high-rise residential settings is significantly limited. Of that which is available the vast majority is international, with only a handful of studies providing UK-based evidence. Furthermore, the quality of studies was mixed, with many based on focused qualitative studies and small-scale quantitative surveys.

 

While this review was conducted to provide comprehensive insight into fire evacuation in UK high-rise residential buildings, it is limited by a paucity of research and an evidence base largely developed in non-UK settings meaning transferability of findings to the UK is unclear. As such, while the findings provide some relevant contextual insight into fire evacuation within high-rise buildings, they do not directly answer the three core research questions central to this review.

 

What are the most effective methods of evacuation from fires in high-rise residential buildings?

 

Considering the limited evidence base within scope of this review, the findings of this review tentatively suggest that, if evacuation is necessary and effective fire safety arrangements such as compartmentation are in place, phased and partial evacuation strategies (in the form of ‘defend-in-place’ and delayed evacuation) are safer than simultaneous evacuation within high-rise residential settings.

 

The evidence also identifies the importance of ‘delayed evacuation’ for those unable to evacuate unassisted, and the necessary requirements to ensure refuge areas are safe and effective. The success of phased or partial evacuation, however, depends on effective compartmentation and communication systems to provide occupants with sufficient and ongoing information.

 

Nonetheless, despite these overarching findings, the body of evidence suggests that no single strategy is universally appropriate for the evacuation of high-rise residential buildings. Instead, every high-rise residential building should have a bespoke fire evacuation plan, developed in full consideration of the building design, the composition of occupants and crucially, the presence, or indeed absence, of effective compartmentation.

 

Synthesis of international modelling and simulation studies suggested that fire safe lifts can reduce overall evacuation time in high-rise buildings. There is however a distinctive lack of UK-specific research on the effectiveness of lifts for fire evacuation within high-rise residential settings. The extent to which this finding can be applied to the UK is therefore unclear.

 

How do occupants make decisions about fire evacuations from high-rise residential buildings?

 

Collectively UK and international evidence suggested occupants do not immediately evacuate upon recognising fire cues, but first check to validate risk, gather belongings and communicate with other residents. Both UK and international studies also suggest occupants of high-rise residential settings are reluctant to use lifts during fire evacuation, which in UK context is in line with the current NFCC ‘stay put’ position statement that in general in the event of an evacuation stairs should always be used rather than a lift (NFCC 2020).

 

This is due to long-standing beliefs that lifts are not safe during a fire, and concerns around safety and delayed evacuation times. Some non-UK evidence suggested occupants of high-rise buildings are more likely to use lifts during fire evacuation if instructed by firefighters. No research on UK occupants’ willingness to use lifts upon firefighter instruction was identified in the review. The extent to which these findings are transferable to UK high-rise residents is therefore unclear.

 

How do firefighters make decisions about evacuating occupants from high-rise residential buildings?

 

This review identified a significant lack of independent peer reviewed academic evidence into how firefighters make decisions regarding the evacuation of occupants from high-rise residential buildings in the event of a fire. Of the limited evidence available, most was international and focused on the decision-making of firefighters in general, rather than specifically in high-rise residential settings.

 

Considering the limited evidence base, the UK and international evidence outlines two main factors that inform firefighter decision-making: pre-determined procedures and previous experience. International evidence also identifies significant amount of information firefighters must assess in their decision-making. This includes specific features of high-rise buildings, and awareness of occupant vulnerabilities and knowledge of occupant adherence to requests to ‘defend-in-place’ or use refuge areas.

 

Future research and evidence gaps

 

While the findings from this review provide some insight into fire evacuation in high-rise residential buildings, the ability to identify the most effective methods of evacuation is limited by a paucity of high-quality research and an evidence base largely developed in non-UK settings. An important contribution of this review is therefore the identification of significant and wide-ranging evidence gaps, which would need to be addressed in order to improve the peer reviewed academic evidence base.

 

These includes research on:

• comparisons of the effectiveness of different evacuation strategies in UK high-rise residential settings
• the effectiveness of lifts for fire evacuation within UK high-rise residential settings
• UK high-rise residents’ willingness to use lifts during fire evacuation upon instruction
• the effective evacuation of vulnerable groups from UK high-rise, residential settings. This includes residents with reduced cognition, residents with small children, residents with English as an additional language, and residents’ potentially limited knowledge of evacuation procedures, such as those who are short-term, un-tenured or guests
• firefighters’ decision-making regarding the evacuation of occupants within UK high-rise residential settings

 

Cllr Tatler responds to challenge over Brent Council's support for tall residential blocks across the borough

 

Brent's Local Plan incudes designated areas for tall buildings as well as intensification corridors  based on the assumption that given the shortage of  land in the borough the only way to address the housing crisis is by building up and maximising high density housing on a small footprint. 

Shama Tatler, Cabinet Member for Regeneration and Planningm recently short-listed to be Labour's parliamentary candidate for the Watford constituency, has been a strong advocate of such a response, even though Labour in Watford has campaigned against the Liberal Democrat Mayor's support for tall buildings.

Covid lockdown revealed problems over contagion of the virus in lifts, staircases and shared landings, as well as the lack of amenity space in which to get socially-distanced exercise in fresh air.

Problems were even worse for families with small children socially isolating in small flats, particularly on upper floors.

Alongside this has been the post-Grenfell cladding crisis which has plunged many into debt as well as anxiety, paying not only for repairs but also for fire-watches. People with disabilities have found themselves in the middle of conflicting advice over 'stay put' policies as well as the difference of opinion over the efficacy of PEEPs (Personal Emergency Evacuation Plans) supported by the London Fire Brigade but opposed by the government. Readers may recall the long-running saga of South Kilburn resident John Healy's attempts to get a PEEP from Brent Council.

Then there is of course the problem of the amount of truly affordable housing in new developments with Brent Council's insistence on terming Shared Ownership affordable. 

Finally academic reports question the energy efficiency of tall buildings when many local authorities, including Brent, have declared a Climate Emergency.

Not limited to tall buildings is the emerging issue of uncapped energy prices for residents whose homes are connected to a District Heating Network. Some relief was promised while all eyes were on Boris Johnson wriggling on a hook of hs own devising, when the government announced. 'We will ensure families living on Heat Networks are better protected. By appointing Ofgem as the new regulator for Heat Network in Great Britain, we will ensure customers get a fair price and a releaible source of heat.' 

Hear Martin Lewis' alarming Channel 4 piece on likely fuel bills in October HERE .

Whether this will be progressed amidst current political turmoil remains to be seen. The government has published a Fact Sheet HERE

It is against this background the the Liberal Democrat councillor for Alperton, Anton Georgiou, ask Shama Tatler a written question ahead of Monday's Council Meeting.

Readers can judge for themselves the adequacy of Cllr Tatler's written response and hear any further discussion on the Council's livestream starting at 6pm on Monday LINK:

 

Question from Councillor Georgiou to Councillor Tatler, Cabinet Member for Regeneration & Planning.

Five years on from the Grenfell Tower disaster, which highlighted to many the safety issues associated with tall buildings, developers with issues in their existing stock (including in Brent) continue to be let off the hook. With building regulations still nowhere near clear enough, what assurances can the Cabinet Members for Regeneration & Planning, give to residents that:

· Tall buildings are safe for local people?
· Tall buildings are suitable as family homes, particularly for young children?
· About the number of families (including how many) Brent currently place in
flats above the 5th floor?
· In view of the 2019 UCL (University College London) study into the energy efficiency of such buildings that allowing so many buildings, higher than 6 storeys, is not making the Climate Emergency in Brent much worse?

Response:

Safety of Tall buildings

The Building Safety Act 2022 contains a series of reforms to building safety and is the most substantial legislative response to the Grenfell Tower fire of 2017.

A Building Safety Regulator (BSR) has been established within the Health and Safety Executive (HSE). Their role relates to buildings with 7 or more storeys or that are 18 metres high and have at least two residential units, or are hospitals or care homes. These are known as higher risk buildings (HRB).

The BSR is likely to rely relies (sic) on council building control services (and fire and rescue services) to deliver the building control regulations for HRBs, which is expected to involve multi-disciplinary teams.

The BSR has three main functions:

(1) To implement a new regulatory regime for higher-risk buildings, and
to be the building control authority for these buildings. This includes
building work on existing HRBs and enforcing the regime in terms of their occupation, as well as new HRBs. The BSR looks at all aspects of the Building Regulations not just fire related provisions. The BSR uses a multi- disciplinary team, which is likely to include local authority building control teams. There are three gateway points where details must be approved before progressing to the next stage:

· planning gateway (in place since August 2021); the planning application must demonstrate that fire safety requirements have been considered and incorporated into the construction proposals;

· construction – pre construction, the regulator must approve the design as compliant with the building regulations;

· completion – at pre-occupation stage, a completion certificate will only be issued by the BSR once they are satisfied that the work is complaint with the building regulations.

Only once Gateway three has been passed (either for partial or full completion) can the new building be registered with the Building Safety Regulator for occupation. The BSR will then be responsible for carrying out checks to ensure that the people responsible for managing HRB’s are managing Building Safety risks, complying with their duties and keeping residents safe through the Building Assessment Certificate process.

(2) To oversee the safety and performance of all buildings. This involves collecting data on the performance of local authority building control services, and external approved inspectors.
(3) To support the competence of those working in the built environment industry, and to manage the register of accredited building inspectors. This involves establishing an industry led competence committee and establishing competence requirements for building control professionals (who need to be in place when the system becomes operational). Brent Building Control will ensure it complies with the requirements.

The BSR will be responsible for holding local authorities and building inspectors to account, with the power to suspend or remove inspectors from the register where necessary.

The Fire Safety Act 2021 became law in April 2021. It introduced changes to fire safety law for buildings containing two or more sets of domestic premises in England and Wales. The aim of the Fire Safety Act is to clarify who is responsible for managing and reducing fire risks in different parts of multi occupied residential buildings. It has introduced new fire safety obligations to some leaseholders, building owners and managers for the building structure, external wall, common parts and doors between domestic premises and common parts.

Suitability of Tall buildings as family homes

Fire safety requirements are for all people and types of household not just families with young children. The above sets out details on the changes that are being implemented.

Number of families Brent currently place in flats above the 5th floor

According to our household records there are 179 children across 108 households living on the fifth floor or above. These 108 households sit across 31 blocks.

Energy efficiency of buildings and impact on Climate Emergency in Brent

 

Both the London Plan and Brent Local Plan have been the subject of Sustainability Appraisals and in themselves include a range of policies to ensure that development including tall buildings respond to climate change and environmental efficiency requirements. Brent Policies for example include minimising greenhouse gas emissions, energy infrastructure, urban greening and sustainable drainage. Tall
buildings allow for an effective use of land in highly accessible locations and have advantages of minimising car travel and support infrastructure being delivered in a sustainable way such as waste management and energy.

 

Disabled campaigners sickened by government refusal to ensure they are issued with Personal Emergency Evacuation Plans (PEEPs) post Grenfell

 From Disability News LINK

Disabled campaigners say they are “horrified” and “sickened” by the government’s “unconscionable” refusal to ensure that disabled people living in high-rise buildings have the right to a personal emergency evacuation plan (PEEP).

Fire minister Lord [Stephen] Greenhalgh told fellow peers on Monday that the government had to question how much it was “reasonable to spend” on ensuring that disabled people have a PEEP as ministers “seek to protect residents and taxpayers from excessive costs”.

He was speaking on Monday as the House of Lords finished its examination of the government’s building safety bill, which will now return to the Commons for MPs to consider amendments made by peers.

The bill approaches its final parliamentary stages nearly five years after the Grenfell Tower disaster, in which 72 people lost their lives, including 15 of its 37 disabled residents.

The ongoing Grenfell Tower Inquiry has already recommended that owners and managers of high-rise residential buildings should be legally required to prepare PEEPs for all residents who may find it difficult to “self-evacuate”.

But the government has refused to back such a proposal in its bill.

As well as the cost of making PEEPs mandatory, Lord Greenhalgh  said on Monday that a government consultation also raised other “substantial difficulties”.

He said: “On practicality, how can you evacuate a mobility-impaired person from a tall building before the professionals from the fire and rescue service arrive?

“On safety, how can you ensure that an evacuation of mobility-impaired people is carried out in a way that does not hinder others in evacuating or the fire and rescue service in fighting the fire?”

He said the government would now launch another consultation, this time looking at its new plans for “emergency evacuation information-sharing” (EEIS), although it has yet to explain how EEIS would work.

It plans to publish the proposals next month on the same day that it releases its response to its PEEPs consultation.

A government spokesperson  on Wednesday declined to provide any further details about ministers’ EEIS plans.

The minister’s comments have horrified campaigners from Claddag, a disabled-led leaseholder action group that is fighting for disabled people within blocks of flats to have the right to an evacuation plan.

Claddag said the new consultation was a “shameful attempt to evade the Grenfell Tower Inquiry’s recommendations” and described the government’s continuing refusal to accept the PEEPs recommendation as “unconscionable”.

A Claddag spokesperson said they were “horrified and deeply dismayed” by Lord Greenhalgh’s comments.

She added: “We were sickened to hear the minister question whether any associated costs of evacuation plans are reasonable as he ‘seeks to protect residents and taxpayers’ from costs.

“Lord Greenhalgh has repeated the tired myth that every evacuation plan involves a cost.

“[He] is provoking fear and resentment among cash-strapped leaseholders against their disabled neighbours, based on a dangerous generalisation.

“The final blow was Lord Greenhalgh’s attempt to shame disabled people into ‘staying put’ in a fire to avoid ‘hindering others’ from evacuating. Please let that sink in.

“It is preposterous for the government to assert that it is ‘committed to supporting the fire safety of disabled people’ when it rejects the use of evacuation plans on the basis of costs, convenience and ableism.”

Claddag said Lord Greenhalgh was wrong to suggest that it was not possible to evacuate mobility-impaired residents before firefighters arrive.

To demonstrate why he was wrong and to highlight Claddag’s concerns about the government’s “absurd” position, Claddag co-founder Sarah Rennie  has given Disability News Service permission to publish details of her own PEEP.

She said: “I presented my own evacuation plan to my managing agents, despite their fire safety advisors urging them to refuse to accept a plan for me and leave me to the fire service. A friend who specialises in evacuation plans helped me put mine together.

“I live on the 13th floor and moved in to my flat on the understanding I could use the lift in a fire.

“As part of the building safety crisis, we discovered my lift was not constructed properly and could not be used in a fire.”

Sarah Rennie:

“We are able to hear our fire alarm clearly. If we are in the flat, my personal assistant (PA) collects my evacuation chair and hoists me into it. All my PAs are trained how to use it and practice regularly. Many of my neighbours have my phone number and check on my whereabouts as we descend the flights of stairs so they can keep the fire service and building management briefed on my location.

“We had a real fire in January on the eighth floor. Despite the time it takes me to transfer and move down the stairs, I had managed to get to the floor below the fire before the fire service arrived. This massively improved my risk of survival. What’s more we barely passed anyone on the stairs as they’d all long gone, so I don’t understand how Greenhalgh thinks I hinder anyone.

“Whilst not everyone has a full time PA like me, not everyone needs this to evacuate. Some people simply need a guiding arm from a neighbour or to check they heard the alarm.

“I have all the components I could possibly need to evacuate safely, so it’s absurd that the government’s policy against evacuation plans would stop me if my managing agents were not responsible and progressive.

“Without my evacuation plan, I would be forced to stay put. Research shows it takes 27 minutes for the Fire Service to intervene. Being rescued in a rush to save your life, without appropriate training or equipment for your impairment, may lead to significant or life-changing injuries. But by rejecting the opportunity to evacuate with time and planning, we’re making these unnecessary injuries virtually inevitable, not to mention the pressure being put on the fire service.”

 Addition from Wembley Matters:

Locally,  John Healy, who lives on the South Kilburn Estate and whose battle to get a PEEP from Brent Council has featured on Wembley Matters tells us:

 

My mobility issues are no longer as bad as they were in September 2020 when I really needed a PEEP, as I was housebound with Long Covid fatigue.

But my block -William Dunbar House, as well as all high -rises in South Kilburn, does not have any fire alarms to alert me, or any other tenants to a possible fire.  

In the two serious fires in my block I never heard my neighbour's shouting "Fire" outside my flat, or for one of the fires, I did not hear a fireman banging on my door telling me to evacuate my building.

I only learned  later on about these warnings and I only became aware of both fires when I smelt the smoke.  Fortunately neither fire turned out to be as bad as they could have been.

As for other residents helping me in a serious fire situation, the chair of my Resident's Association told me. "You are on your own mate, as we will all be making our own escapes as quickly as we can and if you need any help, why not ask the council to see what support they can give you".

UPDATED WITH BRENT COUNCIL STATEMENT: LETTER: Will Brent Housing ever carry out the urgent repair to the self-closing fire door on the 3rd Floor at William Dunbar House, South Kilburn?

 

The fire door that is supposed to be self-closing remains open - allowing flames and smoke to penetrate the building.

 

Brent Council reacts on Twitter to John's first letter - January 18th, 2022

UPDATE February 2nd 2022

 

 

Dear Editor,

 

Will Brent Housing ever carry out the urgent repair to the self-closing fire door on the 3rd Floor at William Dunbar House, South Kilburn?

 

As readers of WM know, I have been trying to get the council to fix the Fire door on the 3rd floor for a long time, which compromises my safety and that of everyone living in the block.

 

Last night there was a serious fire in Poplar on the 8th floor of a tower block which required an emergency evacuation, with some residents escaping via an internal fire escape.

 

If a fire was to break out on the 3rd floor of my block and smoke and flames escaped from the flat where the fire was, it would quickly travel out the open fire door into our only internal fire escape, leaving  everyone living in the block trapped with possible fatal consequences.

 

Nobody can ever predict when a fire might break out in their home, so I am calling on Brent Council for one last time to repair the fire door to ensure the safety of everyone living there.

 

Finally, the council are breaking the law, as The Fire Safety Order (2005) updated in 2021 says "landlords have a duty of care to protect any residents living in William Dunbar House" but for some reasons known only to themselves, they have chosen to break the law by not repairing the fire door.

 

Thank you

John Healy.

 

Here is a reminder of Brent Council's undertaking following the Grenfell disaster

 

 And here is the link to the manufacturer's statement on maintenance:

https://www.gerdasecurity.co.uk/productsandservices/communal-fire-doorsets/maintenance.aspx

 

 

UPDATED WITH COUNCIL RESPONSE: Brent Council must exercise its duty of care and fix the non-operating self-closing fire doors at South Kilburn block. Have they not learnt lessons from Grenfell?

 This 3rd floor self-closing fire door has not been working since 2017 despite notification to Brent Council

A week ago Wembley Matters published a letter from John Healy who lives at William Dunbar House on the South Kilburn Estate. LINK

He had resorted to writing the letter to ask Wembley Matters for helf after his attempts to get Brent Council to repair what are supposed to be self-closing fire doors that have remained open. One since 2017!

John Healy wrote:

At the Grenfell Inquiry, self closing fire doors that did not self close were identified as the second highest issue after unsafe cladding and as a result I have been emailing the council to fix 2 self closing doors that do not self close and which are part of my only fire escape in my high-rise, one on the 3rd floor & one on the 5th floor but after 3 years, they still have not been fixed and everyone's safety is under threat because of this.

I had a response to one of my emails from a housing officer who said "Fire Safety is not included in my job description" and he failed to pass it on to another officer, who did have Fire Safety in their job description.

After 3 years I decided to ask the London Fire Brigade to solve the issue but I was shocked by their reply, which said they were not responsible for Fire Safety in council blocks and they forwarded my email back to Brent Council who failed to take any action as usual.

I hope that now the evidence of failure to rectify is public that Brent Council will exercise its dury of care to residents and quickly fix the problem on the 3rd floor and the more recent 5th floor problem (below) and check every self-closing door in the block.

 As I  was was completing this article I received another email from John Healy that speaks for itself:

Can you ask Brent Housing to carry out a full inspection of all the fire doors in William Dunbar House, as I have only checked those doors up to the 5th floor and for all I know, there may be many others in the floors above me.

At the Grenfell Inquiry Mr. Stokes the Fire Risk assessor carried out his FRA's without actually going into the tower.  Since I began emailing the council, my block has had 2 FRA's, with the last one in 2019 and neither of them noticed the damaged doors.

II can only assume that the FRA's in my block were carried out using the same method as Mr. Stokes, where the assessor never actually visited my block.  The last one even got the location of our only fire escape wrong. He said it was next to the lift shaft and anyone entering the building could clearly see the stairwell began at the far side of the building.

When I reported this to Brent Housing they said "they had full confidence in the FRA assessor and it did not matter that he got the location wrong".

It is worth recalling that a resident of Grenfell had written a series of blog articles drawing attention to the fire danger in the block. He was ignored.

 RESPONSE ON TWITTER SHORTLY AFTER THE ABOVE ARTICLE WAS PUBLISHED

 

UPDATE Has Brent Council learnt nothing from the Grenfell Inquiry and are they putting their disabled residents in peril as a result?

Lawyers involved in the Grenfell Tower Inquiry into the 2017 fire which killed 72 people have described it “as a landmark act of discrimination against disabled and vulnerable people”.

The Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea Council knew about the conditions of Disabled people living in Grenfell Tower but refused to provide them with evacuation plans, and housed some on the upper floors with a ‘stay put’ fire policy, the Inquiry into the Tower fire has heard.

Source Disability Rights UK  

 

UPDATE - Today, the day after this article was published Brent Council leader Muhammed Butt has written to John Healy acknowledging his enquiry of April 21st and stating that it has been forwarded to the respective department who will look into the issue and make every effort to resolve it. He said the Council aimed to respond withing 10 working days.

Readers may recall several articles Wembley Matters has published about the plight of disabled pensioner John Healy who lives in a Brent Council block on the  South Kilburn Estate.

John wrote a personal blog on March 12th  about the issues he was facing and Brent Council made the following statement in response:

"Personal Emergency Evacuation Plans (PEEP) are essential for anyone who may need assistance in the unlikely event of being advised to leave a building because of fire. We're concerned that something seems to have gone wrong here and have contacted Mr Healy to put it right."

John Healy contacted the Council and the Council could not find the PEEP request he had made and asked him to resubmit. He resubmitted and has heard nothing further. John says that officers have stopped replying to his emails.

In their evidence LINK  to the Grenfell Inquiry Bindmans pointed out the failure of the Tenant Management Organisation (TMO) to assess residents' needs:

 Dr Lane finds no evidence that TMO assessed the needs of any vulnerable person in GT in the event of a fire3. This failure resulted in TMO not being appraised of the fire precautions required by RRO in order to protect residents, including vulnerable residents, and failing to advise LFB of the need to assist the vulnerable. The lack of appropriate precautions is reflected in the deaths: a quarter of the 67 child residents present on the night died and 41% of the 37 vulnerable adult residents died.These groups suffered higher death rates than any other category on the night. Yet TMO's spreadsheet emailed during the fire showed only 10 out of 225 residents listed with disabilities5

 Mr Healy is rightly concerned that Brent Council has also failed to adequately assess the needs of its vulnerable residents, putting them at considerable risk.  I would go further and say that they are repeating what Kensington and Chelsea did in ignoring the pleas of their tenants when they draw attention to deficiencies in safety precautions in their blocks. Brent Council brought council housing back in house instead of having the arms length organisation ,Brent Housing Partnership - Brent Housing has direct control and thus direct responsibility for the welbeing and safety of its tenants.

It even appears the Mr Healy is seen as a nuisance who can be ignored.  Today he wrote to his housing officer:

Good afternoon, you may be aware that the Grenfell Inquiry heard today from an officer of Kensington & Chelsea council, as he responded about why he failed to issue PEEPs to several disabled residents in the block, including many who tragically died on the night.

I myself have been asking for a PEEP since last September and I still have not been sent one.

I also need to see the evacuation policy for everyone at William Dunbar House.

And finally can you send me a copy of the latest Fire Risk Assesssment for William Dunbar House please?

Cllr Janice Long has submitted a generic  question to the Council  about PEEPs. according to Mr Healy, which gave him some hopes, but the Council has 14 days to reply, prolonging the uncertainty and anxiety.

John told Wembley Matters he had  contacted a senior officer who deals with Council policy:

 I asked him what did he mean when he said in a debate on Fire Safety in Brent's tower blocks:-

"In terms of people with special needs, we will try and relocate the residents if necessary".

The cabinet said they would review their position on retrofitting sprinklers in the 8 South Kilburn tower blocks (including William Dunbar House), once the result of the South Kilburn resident's ballot is known but they seem to have forgotten to have the review.

I have to remain in my block for several years without any sprinklers, even after the London Fire Brigade  said they could only say a high rise is safe, if they have sprinklers installed in them.

I also checked my most recent Fire Risk Assessment for my block---William Dunbar House over evacuation which says:-

"Physically disabled people should be relatively safe in their own abode should a fire occur elsewhere in the building".

Our rating is 'moderate' which says "in a serious fire there are llikely to be some deaths but not too many".

So if some will die in a serious fire, I have a feeling it is most likely to be me, or another disabled person living in my block.

Just to add, the Brent Housing officers who were dealing with me through email have stopped replying to me.  They have not responded to my Stage 1 complaint either, even though it has gone past their 20 days waiting time before they are supposed to respond.

 So this pensioner with very limited mobility and extreme deafness is left without a Personal Emergency Plan, that is required by law, on the 5th floor of a block without sprinklers or an alarm system that he can hear and with his request for relocation refused. On top of that his Stage 1 complaint made in order to get some sort of hearing has not been responded to within the required 5 days and a further 20 to find a solution. The complaint was made 38 days ago.

Is it any surprise that he feels desperate, ignored and sick with worry?